Intensionality, Intensional Recursion, and the G\"odel-L\"ob axiom by Kavvos, G. A.
ar
X
iv
:1
70
3.
01
28
8v
1 
 [c
s.P
L]
  3
 M
ar 
20
17
Submitted to:
c© G. A. Kavvos
This work is licensed under the
Creative Commons Attribution License.
Intensionality, Intensional Recursion,
and the Go¨del-Lo¨b axiom
G. A. Kavvos
Department of Computer Science
University of Oxford
Oxford, United Kingdom
alex.kavvos@cs.ox.ac.uk
The use of a necessity-like modality in a typed λ -calculus can be used as a device for separating
the calculus in two separate regions. These can be thought of as intensional vs. extensional data:
data in the first region, the modal one, are available as code, and their description can be examined,
whereas data in the second region are only available as values up to ordinary equality. This allows us
to add seemingly non-functional operations at modal types, whilst maintaining consistency. In this
setting the Go¨del-Lo¨b axiom acquires a novel constructive reading: it affords the programmer the
possibility of a very strong kind of recursion, by enabling him to write programs that have access to
their own code. This is a type of computational reflection that is strongly reminiscent of Kleene’s
Second Recursion Theorem. We prove that it is consistent with the rest of the system.
1 Introduction
This paper is about putting a logical twist on two old pieces of programming lore:
• First, it is about using modal types to treat programs-as-data in a type-safe manner.
• Second, it is about noticing that—in the context of intensional programming—a constructive read-
ing of the Go¨del-Lo¨b axiom, i.e. (A→ A)→ A, amounts to a strange kind of recursion,
namely intensional recursion.
We will introduce a typed λ -calculus with modal types that supports both of these features. We will call
it Intensional PCF, after the simply-typed λ -calculus with fixed points studied by Scott [21] and Plotkin
[20].
1.1 Intensionality and Programs-as-data
To begin, we want to discuss our notion of programs-as-data. We mean it in a way that is considerably
stronger than the higher-order functional programming with which we are already familiar, i.e. ‘functions
as first-class citizens.’ In addition to that, our notion hints at a kind of homoiconicity, similar to the one
present in the LISP family of languages. It refers to the ability given to a programmer to quote code,
and carry it around as a datum; see [4] for an instance of that in LISP. This ability can be used for
metaprogramming, which is the activity of writing programs that write other programs; indeed, this is
what LISP macros excel at [10], and this is what the metaprogramming community has been studying
for a long time: see [24, 26].
But we want go even further. In LISP a program is abel to process code by treating it as mere symbols,
thereby disregarding its function and behaviour. This is what we call intensionality: an operation is
intensional if it is finer than equality. Hence, it amounts to a kind of non-functional behaviour.
To our knowledge, this paper presents the first sound, type-safe attempt at intensional programming.
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1.2 Intensional Recursion
We also want to briefly explain what we mean by intensional recursion—a fuller discussion may be
found in [13, 1]. Most modern programming languages support extensional recursion: in the body of a
function definition, the programmer may freely make a finite number of calls to the definiendum itself.
Operationally, this leads a function to examine its own values at a finite set of points at which it has—
hopefully—already been defined. In the untyped λ -calculus, this is modelled by the First Recursion
Theorem (FRT) [3, §2.1, §6.1]:
Theorem 1 (First Recursion Theorem). ∀ f ∈ Λ. ∃u ∈ Λ. u= f u.
However, as Abramsky [1] notes, in the intensional paradigm we have described above, a stronger
kind of recursion is imaginable. Instead of merely examining the result of a finite number of recursive
calls, the definiendum can recursively have access to a full copy of its own source code. This is embodied
in Kleene’s Second Recursion Theorem (SRT) [16]. Here is a version of the SRT in the untyped λ -
calculus, where VuW means ‘the Go¨del number of the term u’ [3, §6.5].
Theorem 2 (Second Recursion Theorem). ∀ f ∈ Λ. ∃u ∈ Λ. u= f VuW.
Kleene also proved the following, where Λ0 is the set of closed λ -terms:
Theorem 3 (Existence of Interpreter). ∃E ∈ Λ0. ∀M ∈ Λ0. EVMW→M
As an interpreter exists, it is not hard to see that the SRT implies the FRT. It is not at all evident whether
we can go the other way around. This is because the SRT is a first-order theorem that is about diagonal-
ization and code, whereas the FRT really is about higher types. See the discussion in [13].
It thus follows that—in the presence of intensional operations—the SRT affords us with a much
stronger kind of recursion. In fact, it allows for a certain kind of computational reflection, or reflective
programming, of the same kind envisaged by Brian Cantwell Smith [22]. But the programme of Smith’s
reflective tower involved a rather mysterious construction with unclear semantics [8, 29, 6], eventually
leading to a theorem that—even in the presence of a mild reflective construct, the so-called fexpr—
observational equivalence of programs collapses to α-conversion [28].
We will use modalities to stop intension from flowing back into extension, so the theorem of [29]
(which involves unrestricted quoting) will not apply. We will achieve reflection by internalising the SRT,
and the key observation for doing so is the following. Suppose that our terms are typed, and that u : A.
Suppose as well that there is a type constructor, , so that A means ‘code of type A.’ Then certainly
VuW : A, and f is forced to have type A→ A. A logical reading of the SRT is then the following:
for every f : A→ A, there exists a u : A such that u = f V fW. This corresponds to Lo¨b’s rule from
provability logic [5]:
A→ A
A
which is equivalent to adding the Go¨del-Lo¨b axiom to the logic. In fact, the punchline of this paper is
that the type of the Second Recursion Theorem is the Go¨del-Lo¨b axiom of provability logic.
To obtain reflective features, then, we will add a version of Lo¨b’s rule to our modal λ -calculus. It
will be equivalent to the above, but proof-theoretically well-behaved—see [27, 14]:
A→ A
A
To our knowledge, this paper presents the first sound, type-safe attempt at reflective programming.
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1.3 Prospectus
In §2 we will introduce the syntax of iPCF, and in §3 we will show that it satisfies basic metatheoretic
properties. Follows that, in section §4, we show how to add intensional operations to iPCF. By proving
that the resulting notion of reduction is confluent, we obtain consistency for the system. We then look at
the computational behaviour of some important terms in §5, and conclude with two key examples of the
new powerful features of our language in §6.
2 Introducing Intensional PCF
Intensional PCF (iPCF) is a typed λ -calculus with modal types. As discussed before, the modal types
work in our favour by separating intension from extension, so that the latter does not leak into the former.
Given the logical nature of the categorical constructs used in our previous work on intensionality [15], we
shall model the types of iPCF after the constructive modal logic S4, in the dual-context style pioneered
by Pfenning and Davies [19, 7]. Let us seize this opportunity to remark that (a) there are also other ways
to capture S4, for which see the survey [13], and that (b) dual-context formulations are not by any means
limited to S4: they began in the context of intuitionistic linear logic, but have recently been shown to
also encompass other modal logics; see [14].
iPCF is not related to the language Mini-ML that is introduced by [7]: that is a call-by-value, ML-
like language, with ordinary call-by-value fixpoints. In contrast, ours is a call-by-name language, with
new kind of fixpoints, namely intensional fixpoints. These fixpoints will afford the programmer the full
power of intensional recursion. Logically, they correspond to throwing the Go¨del-Lo¨b axiom, namely
(A→ A)→ A into S4. Modal logicians might object to this, as—in conjuction with the T axiom
A→ A—it will make every type inhabited. We remind them that a similar situation occurs in PCF,
where the YA : (A→ A)→ A combinator allows one to write a term YA(λx:A. x) : A for any A. As in the
study of PCF, we mostly care about the underlying computation, so it is the morphisms that matter, not
the objects.
The syntax and the typing rules of iPCF may be found in Figure 1. These are largely the same
as Pfenning and Davies’ DS4, save the addition of some constants (drawn from PCF), and a rule for
intensional recursion. The introduction rule for the modality restricts terms under a box (−) to those
containing only modal variables, i.e. variables carrying only intensions or code, but never ‘live values:’
∆ ; · ⊢M : A
∆ ;Γ ⊢ boxM :A
There is also a rule for intensional recursion:
∆ ; z :A ⊢M : A
∆ ;Γ ⊢ fix z in boxM :A
This will be coupled the reduction fix z in boxM −→ boxM [fix z in boxM/z]. This rule is actually a
version of Lo¨b’s rule, and including it in the Hilbert system of a (classical or intuitionistic) modal logic
is equivalent to including the Go¨del-Lo¨b axiom: see [5] and [27]. In fact, we have derived this fixpoint
rule through general considerations of sequent calculi for GL; see [14]. Finally, let us record a fact noticed
by Samson Abramsky, which is that erasing the modality from the types appearing in either Lo¨b’s rule or
the Go¨del-Lo¨b axiom yields the type of YA : (A→ A)→ A, either as a rule, or axiomatically internalised
as a constant (both variants exist in the literature, see [11] and [18].)
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Figure 1: Syntax and Typing Rules for Intensional PCF
Ground Types G ::= Nat | Bool
Types A,B ::= G | A→ B |A
Terms M,N ::= x | λx:A. M |MN | boxM | let box u⇐M in N |
n̂ | true | false | succ | pred | zero? | ⊃G | fix z in boxM
Canonical Forms V ::= n̂ | true | false | λx:A. M | box M
Contexts Γ,∆ ::= · | Γ,x : A
∆ ;Γ ⊢ n̂ : Nat
(b ∈ {true, false})
∆ ;Γ ⊢ b : Bool
∆ ;Γ ⊢ zero? : Nat→ Bool
( f ∈ {succ,pred})
∆ ;Γ ⊢ f : Nat→ Nat
∆ ;Γ ⊢ ⊃G : Bool→ G→ G→ G
(var)
∆ ;Γ,x:A,Γ′ ⊢ x : A
(var)
∆,u:A,∆′ ;Γ ⊢ u : A
∆ ;Γ,x:A ⊢M : B
(→I )
∆ ;Γ ⊢ λx:A.M : A→ B
∆ ;Γ ⊢M : A→ B ∆ ;Γ ⊢ N : A
(→ E )
∆ ;Γ ⊢MN : B
∆ ; · ⊢M : A
(I )
∆ ;Γ ⊢ boxM :A
∆ ;Γ ⊢M :A ∆,u:A ;Γ ⊢ N :C
(E )
∆ ;Γ ⊢ let box u⇐M in N :C
∆ ; z :A ⊢M : A
∆ ;Γ ⊢ fix z in boxM :A
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3 Metatheory
iPCF satisfies the expected basic metatheoretic properties, namely structural and cut rules are admissible.
This is no surprise given its origin in the well behaved Davies-Pfenning DS4. We assume the typical con-
ventions for λ -calculi: terms are identified up to α-equivalence, for which we write ≡, and substitution
[·/·] is defined in the ordinary, capture-avoiding manner. Bear in mind that we consider occurences of u
in N to be bound in let box u⇐M in N. Contexts Γ, ∆ are lists of type assignments x : A. Furthermore,
we shall assume that whenever we write a judgment like ∆ ;Γ ⊢M : A, then ∆ and Γ are disjoint, in the
sense that VARS (∆)∩VARS (Γ) = /0, where VARS (x1 : A1, . . . ,xn : An)
def
= {x1, . . . ,xn}. We write Γ,Γ
′ for
the concatenation of disjoint contexts. Finally, we sometimes write ⊢M : A whenever · ; · ⊢M : A.
Theorem 4 (Structural & Cut). The following rules are admissible in the typing system of iPCF:
1. (Weakening)
∆ ;Γ,Γ′ ⊢M : A
∆ ;Γ,x:A,Γ′ ⊢M : A
2. (Exchange)
∆ ;Γ,x:A,y:B,Γ′ ⊢M :C
∆ ;Γ,y:B,x:A,Γ′ ⊢M :C
3. (Contraction)
∆ ;Γ,x:A,y:A,Γ′ ⊢M : A
∆ ;Γ,w:A,Γ′ ⊢M[w,w/x,y] : A
4. (Cut)
∆ ;Γ ⊢ N : A ∆ ;Γ,x:A,Γ′ ⊢M : A
∆ ;Γ,Γ′ ⊢M[N/x] : A
Theorem 5 (Modal Structural & Cut). The following rules are admissible:
1. (Modal Weakening)
∆,∆′ ;Γ ⊢M :C
∆,u:A,∆′ ;Γ ⊢M :C
2. (Modal Exchange)
∆,x:A,y:B,∆′ ;Γ ⊢M :C
∆,y:B,x:A,∆′ ;Γ ⊢M :C
3. (Modal Contraction)
∆,x:A,y:A,∆′ ;Γ ⊢M :C
∆,w:A,∆′ ;Γ ⊢M[w,w/x,y] :C
4. (Modal Cut)
∆ ; · ⊢ N : A ∆,u:A,∆′ ;Γ ⊢M :C
∆,∆′ ;Γ ⊢M[N/u] :C
4 Consistency of Intensional Operations
In this section we shall prove that the modal types of iPCF allow us to consistently add ‘intensional
operations’ on the modal types. These are non-functional operations on terms, which are not ordinarily
definable, because they violate equality. However, we will show that our use of modal types enables
the separation of intension from extension. We shall do this by adding intensional operations to iPCF,
introducing a notion of reduction, and proving it confluent. A known corollary of confluence is that the
equational theory induced by reduction is consistent, i.e. it does not equate all terms.
There is one very serious caveat, involving extension flowing into intension. That is, we need to
exclude from consideration terms where a variable bound by a λ occurs under the scope of a box (−)
construct. These will never be well-typed, but—since we discuss types and reduction orthogonally—we
also need to explicitly exclude them here too.
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4.1 Adding intensionality
Davies and Pfenning [19] suggested that the modal type can be used to signify intensionality. In fact,
in their previous paper [7] they had prevented reductions from happening under box (−) construct, “
[...] since this would violate its intensional nature.” But the truth is that neither of these presentations
included any genuinely non-functional operations at modal types, and hence their only use was for staged
metaprogramming.
Adding intensional, non-functional operations is a much more difficult task. Intensional operations
are dependent on descriptions and intensions rather than values and extensions. Hence, unlike reduction
and evaluation, they cannot be blind to substitution. This is the most challenging aspect to the whole
endeavour.
The task was recently taken up by Gabbay and Nanevski [9], who attempted to add a construct is-app
to the system of Davies and Pfenning, with the reduction rules
is-app (PQ)−→ true
is-appM −→ false if M is not an application term
They tried to justify this addition in terms of a denotational semantics for modal types, in which the
semantic domain JAK directly involves the actual closed syntax of type A. But something seems to
have gone wrong with substitution. In fact, we believe that their proof of soundness is wrong: it is not
hard to see that their semantics is not stable under the second of those two reductions: take M to be u,
and let the semantic environment map u to an application box PQ. We can also see this in the fact that
their notion of reduction is not confluent; here is the relevant counterexample: we can reduce
let box u⇐ box (PQ) in is-app (box u)−→ is-app (box PQ)−→ true
but we we can also reduce as follows:
let box u⇐ box (PQ) in is-app (box u)−→ let box u⇐ box (PQ) in false−→ false
This is easily discoverable if one tries to plough through a proof of confluence: it is very clearly not
the case that M→ N implies M[P/u]→ N[P/u] if u is under a box (−) and operations made of the same
ilk as is-app. Perhaps the following idea has the makings of a workable proposal: let us limit intensional
operations to a chosen set of functions f : T (A) → T (B) from terms of type A to terms of type B,
and then represent them in the language by a constant f˜ , such that f˜ (boxM)→ box f (M). This set of
functions would then be chosen so that they satisfy some sanity conditions. Since we want to have a let
construct that allows us to substitute code variables for code, the following general situation will occur:
if N→ N ′, we have
let box u⇐ boxM in N −→ N[M/u]
and
let box u⇐ boxM in N −→ let box u⇐ boxM in N ′ −→ N ′[M/u]
Thus, in order to have confluence, we need N[M/u] → N ′[M/u]. This will only be the case for
reductions of the form f˜ (boxM)→ box f (M) if f (N[M/u])≡ ( f (N)) [M/u], i.e. if f is substitutive. But
then a simple naturality argument gives that f (N) ≡ f (u[N/u]) ≡ ( f (u)) [N/u], and hence f˜ is already
definable by λx:A. let box u⇐ x in box f (u), so such a ‘substitutive’ function is neither intensional nor
non-functional after all.
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In fact, the only truly intensional operations we can add to our calculus will be those acting on
closed terms. We will see that this circumvents the problems that arise when intensionality interacts with
substitution. So we will limit intensional operations to the following set:
Definition 1 (Intensional operations). Let T (A) be the set of termsM such that · ; · ⊢M : A. Let F (A,B)
be the set of all functions f : T (A)→T (B).
We will include all of these intensional operations f : T (A)→T (B) in our calculus, as constants:
∆ ;Γ ⊢ f˜ :A→B
with reduction rule f˜ (boxM) → box f (M), under the proviso that M is closed. Of course, this also
includes operations on terms that might in some sense not be computable. However, we are interested
in proving consistency in the most general setting. The questions of which intensional operations are
computable, and which primitives can and should be used to express them, are both still open.
4.2 Reduction and Confluence
We introduce a notion of β -reduction for iPCF, which we present in Figure 2. Unlike most studies
of PCF-like languages, we do not consider a reduction strategy at first, but simply ordinary, ‘non-
deterministic’ β -reduction. We do so because are trying to show consistency.
The equational theory induced by this notion of reduction is a symmetric version of it, annotated
with types. It is easy to write down, so we omit it. Note that fact that, like in the work of Davies and
Pfenning, we do not include the congruence rule for the modality:
∆ ; · ⊢M = N : A
(cong)
∆ ;Γ ⊢ boxM = box N :A
In fact, the very absence of this rule is what will allow modal types to become intensional. Otherwise, the
only new rules are (a) intensional recursion, embodied in the rule (fix), and (b) intensional operations,
exemplified by the rule (int).
We can now show that
Theorem 6. The reduction relation −→ is confluent.
The easiest route to that theorem is to use a proof like that in [14], i.e. the method of parallel
reduction. This kind of proof was originally discovered by Tait and Martin-Lo¨f, and is nicely documented
in [25]. Beause of the intensional nature of our box (−) constructs, ours will be more nuanced and fiddly.
We omit the details, for want of space (but see the appendix).
5 Some important terms
Let us look at the kinds of terms we can write in iPCF.
From the axioms of S4 First, we can write a term corresponding to axiom K, the normality axiom:
axK
def
= λ f :(A→ B). λx :A. let box g⇐ f in let box y⇐ x in box (gy)
It is easy to see that ⊢ axK :(A→ B)→ (A→B). An intensional reading of this is as follows:
any function given as code can be transformed into an effective operation, mapping code to code.
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Figure 2: Beta reduction for Intensional PCF
(−→ β )
(λx:A. M)N −→M[N/x]
M −→ N
(congλ )
λx:A. M −→ λx:A. N
M −→ N
(app1)
MP−→ NP
P−→ Q
(app2)
MP−→MQ
(β )
let box u⇐ boxM in N −→ N[M/u]
(fix)
fix z in boxM −→ boxM[fix z in boxM/z]
M closed, f (M) ↓
(int)
f˜ (boxM)−→ box f (M)
M −→ N
(let-cong1)
let box u⇐M in P−→ let box u⇐ N in P
P−→ Q
(let-cong2)
let box u⇐M in P−→ let box u⇐M in Q
(zero?1)
zero? 0̂−→ true
(zero?2)
zero? n̂+1−→ false
(succ)
succ n̂−→ n̂+1
(pred)
pred n̂−→
̂
n
·
−1
(⊃1)
⊃G trueM N −→M
(⊃2)
⊃G falseM N −→ N
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The rest of the axioms correspond to evaluating and quoting, as discussed before. Axiom T takes
code to value, or intension to extension:
⊢ evalA
def
= λx :A. let box y⇐ x in y :A→ A
and axiom 4 quotes code into code-for-code:
⊢ quoteA
def
= λx :A. let box y⇐ x in box (box y) :A→A
The Go¨del-Lo¨b axiom: intensional fixed points Since the (fix) rule is a variant of Lo¨b’s rule, we
expect to already have a term corresponding to the Go¨del-Lo¨b axiom of provability logic. We
do—and it is an intensional fixed-point combinator:
YA
def
= λx :(A→ A). let box f ⇐ x in (fix z in box ( f z))
and ⊢YA :(→ A)→A. We observe that
YA(boxM)−→
∗ fix z in boxMz−→ boxM(fix z in boxMz)
Undefined The combination of eval and YA lead to non-termination, in a style reminiscent of the term
(λx.xx)(λx.xx) of the untyped λ -calculus. Let
ΩA
def
= fix z in box (evalA z)
Then ⊢ ΩA :A, and ΩA −→ box (evalA ΩA), so that evalA ΩA −→
∗ evalA ΩA.
Extensional Fixed Points Perhaps surprisingly, the ordinary PCF Y combinator is also definable in the
iPCF. Let
UA
def
= fix z in box (λ f : A→ A. f (eval z f ))
Then ⊢UA :((A→ A)→ A), and we can define
YA
def
= eval(A→A)→A UA
with the result that YA f −→
∗ f (YA f ).
6 Two intensional examples
No description of an intensional language with intensional recursion would be complete without an
example of both of these features. Our first example is about intensionality, and is drawn from the
study of PCF and issues related to sequential vs. parallel (but not concurrent) computation. Our second
example is slightly more adventurous: it is a computer virus.
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6.1 ‘Parallel or’ by dovetailing
In [20], Gordon Plotkin proved the following theorem: there is no term por :Bool→Bool→Bool of PCF
such that por true M։β true and por M true։β true for any ⊢M : Bool, whereas por false false։β
false. Intuitively, the problem is that por has to first examine one of its two arguments, and this can be
troublesome if that argument is non-terminating. It follows that the parallel or function is not definable
PCF . In order to regain the property of so-called full abstraction for the Scott model of PCF, a constant
denoting this function has to be manually added to PCF, and endowed with the above rather clunky
operational semantics. See [20, 11, 18, 23].
However, the parallel or function is a perfectly computable partial recursive functional [23, 17].
The way to prove that is informally the following: given two closed terms M,N : Bool, take turns in
β -reducing each one for a few steps. This is called dovetailing. If at any point one of the two terms
reduces to true, then output true. But if at any point both reduce to false then output false.
This procedure is not definable in PCF, because a candidate term por does not have access to a code
for its argument, for it can only inspect its value. But in iPCF, we can use the modality to have access
to code, and intensional operations to implement reduction. Suppose we pick a reduction strategy −→ r.
Then, let us include a constant tick :Bool→Bool that implements one step of this reduction strategy
on closed terms:
M −→r N
tick (boxM)−→ box N
Also, let us include a constant done? : Bool→ Bool, which tells us if a closed term under a box is a
normal form:
M normal
done? (boxM)−→ true
M not normal
done? (boxM)−→ false
These two can be subsumed under our previous scheme for introducing intensional operations. The
above argument is now implemented by the following term:
por :≡ Y(λ por. λx :Bool. λy :Bool.
⊃Bool (done? x) (lor (eval x)(eval y))
(⊃Bool (done? y) (ror (eval x)(eval y))
(por (tick x)(tick y)))
where lor, ror : Bool → Bool → Bool are terms defining the left-strict and right-strict versions of the
‘or’ connective respectively. Notice that the type of this term of Bool→ Bool→ Bool: we require
intensional access to the terms of boolean type in order to define this computation.
6.2 A computer virus
Abstract computer virology is the study of formalisms that model computer viruses. There are many
ways to formalise viruses. We will use the model of Adleman [2], where files can be interpreted either
as data, or as functions. We introduce a data type F , and two constants
in :(F → F)→ F and out : F →(F → F)
such that out (in M)→M, making (F → F) a retract of F . This might seem the same as the situation
where F → F is a retract of F , which yields models of the (untyped) λ -calculus and is difficult to
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construct [3, §5.4], but it is not nearly as worrying: (F → F) is populated by intensions and codes,
not by actual functions. Under this interpretation, the pair (in,out) corresponds to a kind of Go¨del
numbering—especially if F is N.
Now, in Adleman’s model, a virus is a given by its infected form, which either injures, infects, or
imitates other programs. The details are unimportant in the present discussion, save from the fact that
one can construct such a virus from its infection routine by using Kleene’s SRT. Let us model it by a term
infect :(F → F)→ F → F , which accepts a piece of viral code and a file, and it returns either the file
itself, or a version infected with the viral code. We can then define a term virus :(F → F):
virus
def
= fix z in box infect z
so that virus −→ ∗ box (infect virus). We then have that
eval virus−→ ∗ infect virus
which is a program that is ready to infect its input with its own code.
7 Conclusion
We have achieved the desideratum of an intensional programming language, with intensional recursion.
There are two main questions that result from this development.
Firstly, does there exist a good set of intensional primitives from which all others are definable? Is
there perhaps more than one such set, hence providing us with a choice of programming primitives?
Secondly, what is the exact kind of programming power that we have unleashed? Does it lead to
interesting programs that we have not been able to write before? We have outlined some speculative
applications for intensional recursion in [12]. Is iPCF a useful tool when it comes to attacking these?
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A Appendix: Proof of confluence
We will use a variant of the proof in [14], i.e. the method of parallel reduction. This kind of proof was
originally discovered by Tait and Martin-Lo¨f, and is nicely documented in [25]. Beause of the intensional
nature of our box (−) constructs, ours will be more nuanced and fiddly than any in op. cit. The method
largely follows the following pattern: we will introduce a second notion of reduction,
=⇒⊆ Λ×Λ
which we will ‘sandwich’ between reduction proper and its transitive closure:
−→ ⊆ =⇒⊆ −→ ∗
We will then show that =⇒ has the diamond property. By the above inclusions, the transitive closure
=⇒∗ of =⇒ is then equal to −→ ∗, and hence −→ is Church-Rosser.
In fact, we will follow [25] in doing something better: we will define for each term M its complete
development, M⋆. The complete development is intuitively defined by ‘unrolling’ all the redexes of M at
once. We will then show that if M =⇒ N, then N =⇒M⋆. M⋆ will then suffice to close the diamond:
M
P Q
M⋆
The parallel reduction =⇒ is defined in Figure 3. Ordinarily, instead of the axiom (refl) ensuring
M =⇒M, we would simply have an axiom for variables, x =⇒ x. Then, M =⇒M would be derivable.
However, we do not have a congruence rule for box (−), and also our fixpoint construct would block the
possibility of this. We are thus forced to include M =⇒M, which slightly complicates the lemmas that
follow.
Indeed, the main lemma that usually underpins the confluence proof is this: ifM =⇒N and P=⇒Q,
M[P/x] =⇒ N[Q/x]. However, this is intuitively wrong: no reductions should happen under boxes, so
this should only hold if we are substituting for a variable not occuring under boxes. Hence, this lemma
splits into three different ones:
• one showing that P=⇒Q impliesM[P/x] =⇒M[Q/x], if x does not occur under boxes: this is the
price to pay for replacing the variable axiom with (refl);
• one showing that M =⇒ N implies M[P/u] =⇒ N[P/u], even if u is under a box; and
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Figure 3: Parallel Reduction
(refl)
M =⇒M
M =⇒ N P=⇒ Q
(→ β )
(λx:A. M)P=⇒ N[Q/x]
M =⇒ N
(congλ )
λx:A. M =⇒ λx:A. N
M =⇒ N P=⇒Q
(app)
MP=⇒ NQ
M =⇒M′
(⊃1)
⊃G trueM N =⇒M
′
N =⇒ N ′
(⊃2)
⊃G falseM N =⇒ N
′
M =⇒ N
(β )
let box u⇐ box P inM =⇒ N[P/u]
(fix)
fix z in boxM =⇒ boxM[fix z in boxM/z]
M closed, f (M) ↓
(int)
f˜ (boxM) =⇒ box f (M)
M =⇒ N P=⇒Q
(let-cong)
let box u⇐M in P=⇒ let box u⇐ N inQ
Remark. In addition to the above, one should also include rules for the constants, but these are merely
restatements of the rules in Figure 2.
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• one showing that, if x does not occur under boxes,M=⇒N and P=⇒Q indeed implyM[P/x] =⇒
N[Q/x]
But let us proceed with the proof.
Lemma 1. If M =⇒ N then M[P/u] =⇒ N[P/u].
Proof. By induction on the generation of M =⇒ N. Most cases trivially follow, or consist of simple
invocations of the IH. In the case of (→ β ), the known substitution lemma suffices. Let us look at the
cases involving boxes.
CASE(β ). Then M =⇒ N is let box v⇐ box R in S =⇒ S′[R/v] with S =⇒ S′. By the IH, we
have that S[P/u] =⇒ S′[P/u], so let box v⇐ box R[P/u] in S[P/u] =⇒ S[P/u][R[P/u]/v], and this
last is α-equivalent to S[R/v][P/u] by the substitution lemma.
CASE(fix). A similar application of the substitution lemma.
CASE(int). Then M =⇒ N is f˜ (box Q) =⇒ box f (Q), with Q closed. Hence
(
f˜ (box Q)
)
[P/u]≡ f˜ (box Q) =⇒ box f (Q)≡ ( f (Q)) [P/u]
simply because Q is closed.
Lemma 2. If P=⇒Q and x 6∈ FV≥1 (M), then M[P/x] =⇒M[Q/x].
Proof. By induction on the term M. The only non-trivial cases are those for M being a variable, or
boxM′. In the first case, depending on which variable M is, use either (refl), or the assumption P=⇒Q.
In the second case, (boxM′)[P/x] ≡ boxM′ ≡ (boxM′)[Q/x] as x does not occur under a box, so use
(refl) again.
Lemma 3. If M =⇒ N, P=⇒ Q, and x 6∈ FV≥1 (M), then
M[P/x] =⇒ N[Q/x]
Proof. By induction on the generation of M =⇒ N. The cases for most congruence rules and constants
follow trivially, or from the IH. We prove the rest.
CASE(refl). ThenM =⇒N is actuallyM =⇒M, so we use Lemma 2 to inferM[P/x] =⇒M[Q/x].
CASE(int). Then M =⇒ N is actually f˜ (boxM) =⇒ box f (M). But M is then closed, so(
f˜ (boxM)
)
[P/x]≡ f˜ (boxM) =⇒ box f (M)≡ (box f (M)) [Q/x].
CASE(⊃i). Then M =⇒ N is ⊃G true M N =⇒ M
′ with M =⇒ M′. By the IH, M[P/x] =⇒
M′[Q/x], so
⊃G trueM[P/x] N[P/x] =⇒M
′[Q/x]
by a single use of (⊃1). The case for false is similar.
CASE(→ β ). Then (λx′:A. M)N =⇒ N ′[M′/x′], where M =⇒M′ and N =⇒ N ′. Then
(
(λx′:A. M)N
)
[P/x]≡ (λx′:A. M[P/x])(N[P/x])
16 Intensionality, Intensional Recursion, and the Go¨del-Lo¨b axiom
But, by the IH,M[P/x] =⇒M′[Q/x] and N[P/x] =⇒N ′[Q/x]. So, by the rules (congλ ) and (app),
and then rule (→ β ), we have
(λx′:A. M[P/x])(N[P/x]) =⇒M′[Q/x]
[
N ′[Q/x]/x′
]
But this last is α-equivalent to (M′[N ′/x′]) [Q/x] by the substitution lemma.
CASE(β ). Then let box u′ ⇐ boxM in N =⇒ N ′[M/u′] where N =⇒ N ′. By assumption, we
have that x 6∈ FV (M) and x 6∈ FV≥1 (N). Hence, we have by the IH that N[P/x] =⇒ N
′[Q/x], so by
applying (β ) we get
(let box u′⇐ boxM in N)[P/x]≡ let box u′⇐ boxM[P/x] in N[P/x]
≡ let box u′⇐ boxM in N[P/x]
=⇒ N ′[Q/x][M/u′]
But this last is α-equivalent to N ′[M/u′][Q/x], by the substitution lemma and the fact that x does
not occur in M.
CASE(fix). As x 6∈ FV≥1 (fix z in boxM), we have that x does not occur inM, and thus (fix z in boxM)[P/x]≡
fix z in boxM, and also
(boxM[fix z in boxM/z])[Q/x] ≡ boxM[fix z in boxM/z]
Thus, a single use of (fix) suffices.
We now pull the following definition out of the hat:
Definition 2 (Complete development). The complete development M⋆ of a term M is defined by the
following clauses:
x⋆
def
= x
c⋆
def
= c (c ∈ { f˜ , n̂,zero?, . . .})
(λx:A. M)⋆
def
= λx:A. M⋆
(
f˜ (boxM)
)⋆ def
= box f (M) if M is closed
((λx:A. M)N)⋆
def
=M⋆[N⋆/x]
(⊃G trueM N)
⋆ def=M⋆
(⊃G falseM N)
⋆ def= N⋆
(MN)⋆
def
=M⋆N⋆
(boxM)⋆
def
= boxM
(let box u⇐ boxM in N)⋆
def
= N⋆[M/u]
(let box u⇐M in N)⋆
def
= let box u⇐M⋆ in N⋆
(fix z in boxM)⋆
def
= boxM[fix z in boxM/z]
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We need the following two technical results as well.
Lemma 4. M =⇒M⋆
Proof. By induction on the term M. Most cases follow immediately by (refl), or by the IH and an
application of the relevant rule. The case for boxM follows by (refl), the case for fix z in boxM follows
by (fix), and the case for f˜ (boxM) by (int).
Lemma 5 (BFV antimonotonicity). If M =⇒ N then FV≥1 (N)⊆ FV≥1 (M).
Proof. By induction on M =⇒ N.
And here is the main result:
Theorem 7. If M =⇒ P, then P=⇒M⋆.
Proof. By induction on the generation of M =⇒ P. The case of (refl) follows by lemma variable rule is
trivial, and the cases of congruence rules follow from the IH. We show the rest.
CASE(→ β ). Then we have (λx:A. M)N =⇒M′[N ′/x], with M =⇒M′ and N =⇒ N ′. By the IH,
M′ =⇒M⋆ and N ′ =⇒N⋆. We have that x 6∈ FV≥1 (M), so by Lemma 5 we get that x 6∈ FV≥1 (M
′).
Hence, by Lemma 3 we get M′[N ′/x] =⇒M⋆[N⋆/x]≡ ((λx:A. M)N)⋆.
CASE(β ). Then we have
let box u⇐ boxM in N =⇒ N ′[M/u]
where N =⇒ N ′. By the IH, N ′ =⇒ N⋆, so it follows that
N ′[M/u] =⇒ N⋆[M/u]≡ (let box u⇐ boxM in N)⋆
by Lemma 1.
CASE(fix). Then we have
fix z in boxM =⇒ boxM[fix z in boxM/z]
But (fix z in boxM)⋆ ≡ boxM[fix z in boxM/z], so a single use of (refl) suffices.
CASE(int). Similar.
